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Abstract 
 How can human agency be reconciled with bio-physical determinism? Starting with 
a discussion of the long standing debate between determinism and agency, we argue 
that the seeds of a reconciliation can be found in George Herbert Mead’s ideas 
concerning social acts, perspectives, differentiation, self-other interactivity, and 
conscious understanding. Drawing on more recent reformulations of Mead’s ideas, 
we present an integrated account of the ontogenesis of human agency. Human 
agency, we argue, should be conceptualized in terms of distanciation from 
immediate experience, and we show how social interactions, institutions and 
symbolic resources foster the development of agency in increasingly complex ways. 
We conclude by situating our work in relation to other developmental accounts and 
the larger project of theorizing and empirically supporting a compatibilist rendering 
of human agency as the “determined” self-determination of persons. 
 
Keywords: Mead, agency, position exchange, role exchange, intersubjectivity, 
distanciation 
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A Neo-Meadian Approach to Human Agency: Relating the Social and the 
Psychological in the Ontogenesis of Perspective-Coordinating Persons 
 Many psychologists and philosophers now treat as passé canonical tensions 
that have endured since Thomas Hobbes’ famous seventeenth-century debate with 
Bishop Bramwell concerning the compatibility of free will and determinism. Most 
contemporary recommendations to move beyond this classic tension confidently 
assert a scientifically established compatibilism that understands free will as human 
self-determination, and treats such agency as entirely consistent with biophysical 
determinism and sociocultural constraints. For the most part, the underlying 
suggestion is that persons have evolved and developed as bio-cultural hybrids 
whose emergent psychological capabilities enable them to self-determine. More 
particularly, these self-determining capabilities have been, and continue to be 
constituted, both philogenetically and ontogenetically, through persons’ activity and 
interactivity within their biophysical and sociocultural world (e.g., Bickhard, 2004, 
2008, in press; Dennett, 2003; Donald, 2001; Martin, 2003, in press; Martin, 
Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003; Martin, Sugarman, & Hickinbottom, 2010; Searle, 
2001, 2007). In consequence, persons ought now be understood as both determined 
and determining in that they are emergent within both phylogenesis and 
ontogenesis in ways that require appeal only to known and plausible evolutionary 
and developmental processes and scenarios. 
 Thus, Dennett (2003) suggests that our biophysical, cultural, and socio-
psychological evolution tells us that new kinds of things can and do emerge in the 
world through evolutionary and developmental processes that are entirely 
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explicable, and which require no postulation of other worldly or otherwise 
mysterious origins. Dennett goes on to say that people: 
have evolved to be entities designed to change their nature in response 
to interactions with the rest of the world […]. From the engaged agent’s 
perspective, things change over time, and agents change to meet those 
changes. But of course not all change is possible for us. There are things 
we can change and things we can’t change, and some of the latter are 
deplorable. There are many things wrong with our world, but 
determinism isn’t one of them, even if our world is determined. (p. 93) 
Dennett forges a contemporary, scientifically informed compatibilism between 
determinism and agency, in which determinism does not imply inevitability for 
human agents whose evolved nature (as language and culture capable, reasoning, 
and moral beings) is to be self-consciously reactive to their circumstances. Persons, 
according to Dennett, are self-determining agents with a “subjectively open future” 
(p. 93) and a constantly emerging nature. In consequence, despite the fact that at 
any instant there is exactly one physically possible future (“The physics involved are 
eternally changeless, so the micro events are always the same” -- p. 90), for persons 
as self-determining agents, the future may be variegated:  
It may contain some patterns that are like the patterns of the past, and it may 
contain others that are entirely novel. In some deterministic worlds, that is, 
there are things whose natures change over time, so determinism does not 
imply a fixed nature” (p. 91).1 
                                                        
1Note that any determined future that includes the agency of persons, while 
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 In somewhat similar vein, at least with respect to persons as self-determining 
agents, John Searle (2001, 2007) offers a transcendental argument for self-
determination that stresses the rational agency of persons. Searle argues that: 
We have the first-person conscious experience of acting on reasons. We 
state these reasons for action in the form of explanations. The 
explanations are obviously quite adequate because we know in our own 
case that, in their ideal form, nothing further is required. But they cannot 
be adequate if they are treated as ordinary causal explanations because 
they do not pass the causal sufficiency test […]. They are not of the form 
A caused B. They are of the form, a rational S performed act A, and in 
performing A, S acted on reason R […]. I am claiming that the condition of 
possibility of the adequacy of rational explanations is the existence of an 
irreducible self, a rational agent, capable of acting on reasons. (2007, p. 
57) 
Searle concludes that positing of an irreducibly self-determining agent requires 
nothing mysterious or immaterial. It requires only that we take seriously the 
biophysical and sociocultural constitution of the psychological capabilities of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
determined, may not be entirely predictable. Ironically, the more we understand 
about our own determinants, the more we become self-determining. For example, 
the more we know about the causes of illness, the more we can intervene in illness. 
The more we know about the genetic determinants of our biological being, then the 
more we can begin to intervene in our own genetic make up. Determinism at a 
biophysical level can become self-determination at a cultural-psychological level. 
But that self-determination does not escape determinism, rather it is built upon 
determinism. 
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persons – that is, their evolutionary and developmentally acquired capabilities of 
acting within the relational and linguistic practices, including practices of reasoning, 
extant in their worldly contexts and experiences.2 
 Not surprisingly, philosophers like Dennett and Searle defer to evolutionary 
and developmental theorists and researchers to instantiate scientifically verified 
and plausible details of the evolutionary and developmental accounts they assume 
with respect to the origins of persons as self-determining agents. In recent years, a 
number of social, developmental psychologists have taken up the enormously 
complex task of documenting relevant aspects of the ontogenetic development of 
persons as self-determining agents (e.g., Barresi, 1999, in press;  Bickhard, 2004, 
2008; Falmagne, 2004; Harré, 1998; Stetsenko & Arievitch, 2004; Tomasello, 1999, 
2008). Such accounts tend to converge on the central idea of persons as “social 
developmental emergents” (Bickhard, 2008, p. 36).  For Bickhard (2008), persons 
are constituted developmentally “in and of a social/cultural emergent level of 
reality. Human society and persons coconstitute each other, both developmentally 
and occurrently” (p. 36). Following suit, Martin, Sugarman, and Hickinbottom 
(2010), define persons as “embodied, reasoning, and moral agents with self-
                                                        
2Note that acting on the basis of reasons often involves reasoning about what would 
occur if a given course of action were or were not taken. In this way, anticipated, 
possible consequences of particular actions and non-actions enter into the 
reasoning that is the basis for acting. Determinism is the basis for much reasoning and 
human agency because it is by reasoning about the determinants of behavior that humans 
become their own agents. We know that stimuli determine our behavior, and so we hide 
desirable and distracting stimuli when we want to avoid interruption. Yet, even when we 
misunderstand the determinants, these misunderstandings still feed into our actions. What 
is thought might happen becomes a determinant of what does happen because 
people are reacting to and reasoning about possible futures.   
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consciousness and self-understanding, as well as social and psychological identity, 
who have unique capabilities of language-use, and are distinctively culture-capable” 
(p. 273).  Moreover, in common with Dennett (2003) and Bickhard (2008) “these 
various defining characteristics and capabilities of persons are emergent within the 
worldly activity of biological human beings embedded in, and interactively 
coordinating with others and objects in, the biophysical and sociocultural contexts 
that make up their life world” (Martin, et al., p. 274).3  
However, despite broad agreement that human agency can emerge out of 
deterministic processes, it remains unclear exactly how this emergence might occur. 
In the present article, we articulate a recently developed neo-Meadian approach to 
the ontogenetic emergence of persons as self-determining agents that is directly 
relevant to the kinds of theorizing just considered. This is an approach based on the 
social-psychological theorizing of George Herbert Mead during the early part of the 
twentieth century (Mead, 1932, 1934, 1938), and extended during the past few 
years by each of us, working mostly independently (Gillespie, 2005; 2006a, 2006b, 
in press; Martin 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, in press). What we understand as unique 
to Mead’s approach and our extension of it are two features of direct relevance to 
human agency understood as the self-determination of persons. First, despite some 
                                                        
3The concept of emergence employed herein is simultaneously an ontological and 
epistemological one that connotes the arising of new forms of being and knowing 
enabled by more basic levels of being and knowing. Beyond this general definition, 
any particular instance of emergence calls for a more detailed explication of 
particular levels and kinds of being and knowing and how they inter-relate to create 
new forms of being and knowing. Our concern herein is to provide just such an 
explication of the ontogenetic emergence of the self-determined agency of 
developing persons. 
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contentions to the contrary, this is an approach that explains the emergence of both 
selfhood and agency in ways that do not assume the prior existence of either or both 
selfhood or agentive capability. Secondly, this approach offers a reasonably detailed 
account of a specific developmental trajectory that explains how participation in 
social acts and practices results in more abstracted, psychological capabilities of 
perspective taking and perspectival consideration and reasoning that are among the 
most important conditions for agentive, self-determining persons. 
 We begin with a brief recapitulation of Mead’s ideas concerning social acts, 
perspectives, self-other interactivity, differentiation, and conscious understanding. 
We then move on to the main part of our paper in which we bring together ideas 
that each of us has written about independently into a more integrated, complete 
account of the ontogenetic development of human agency as the self-determination 
of persons. This account is presented in Figure 1, and then discussed in detail. We 
conclude with some general remarks about our work in relation to other 
developmental accounts and the larger project of theorizing and empirically 
supporting a compatibilist rendering of human agency as the “determined” self-
determination of persons. 
Mead’s Perspectival Social Psychology of Selfhood and Human Agency 
 George Herbert Mead (1932, 1934, 1938) developed an approach to the 
social psychological development of persons as agents that emphasized the holistic 
acting of persons within their biophysical and sociocultural world. In both 
phylogeny and ontogeny, it is the activity and interactivity of persons in the world 
that drives evolutionary and developmental processes through which biological 
                                                                     A Neo-Meadian Approach to Human Agency  9 
human beings emerge as social persons with social and psychological identity, 
rational and moral agency, and complex capabilities and understandings of 
perspective coordination, culture capability, language, and self-determination. 
Throughout our lives, we act towards, and in relation to objects and other persons 
based on our cumulative history of direct, practical experience with them.  The 
perceptions and perspectives with which we orient to the world, and use as a basis 
for coordinating our worldly activity, are a consequence of this cumulative history. 
It is by learning to coordinate our activity and interactivity with the actions and 
perspectives of others that we develop as psychological beings with self-
understanding, and purposeful, agentive capability. 
 All organisms are in a perspectival relation to their environment (Mead, 
1932). Mead describes how grass is food in relation to the stomach of the cow, how 
places reverberate with the smell of recent goings on in relation to the finely tuned 
olfactory capability of a dog, and how a wooden table is food in relation to the 
woodworm. In each such case, the organism is not only in a perspectival relation to 
the world, but, trapped in such a relation. The cow cannot see the grass as anything 
but food. Humans, on the other hand, are at the intersection of more perspectives 
and accordingly are more able to distanciate from any one perspective. Indeed, 
humans, are unique in the extent to which they can distanciate from any one 
perspectival relation to the world, and this, Mead argues, is the basis of human 
agency. 
According to Mead, humans live in a temporally and spatially extended 
environment.  For Mead (1927, p. 170), the locus of reality is in the manipulatory 
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area, or in immediate activity. While many non-human animals are relatively 
trapped in their immediate activity, responding reflexively to stimuli within their 
situation, humans, Mead argued, live in a larger environment. Despite always being 
located in a here-and-now context, humans are often aware of other spaces and 
times. Spaces beyond the immediate zone of perception are real for us and can 
motivate action. Thus, within any particular situation, human beings can be 
motivated by the perspectives of others. Moreover, recalled pasts and imagined 
futures are woven into our perception of immediately present situations such that 
we can act not on the basis of what is, but on the basis of what might be, or even, 
what might happen if we don’t act a certain way. It is, according to Mead, by 
inhabiting this extended environment, in which other perspectives, other situations, 
and other times permeate the present, that humans find their agency. It is only 
within such an extended environment that self-determining choices become 
possible.  
The concept of emergence takes on a very particular meaning within Mead’s 
scheme. While objects in the world might have relatively stable properties or 
aspects in relation to a given perspective, when two perspectives intersect 
emergence can ensue. For example, a cup of coffee is usually part of a perspective 
oriented to mental stimulation, but, if one is working outside on a windy day, then, 
the cup of coffee can emerge as a paper-weight. This emergence, Mead would argue, 
is genuine and not simply an expression of an essential quality of the cup (namely its 
weightiness). The fact that the cup can stop the papers blowing away constitutes the 
weightiness of the cup. If the cup existed within relations in which weight was of no 
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consequence, then weight would not be a quality of the cup. Equally, new aspects of 
the cup are likely to arise when the cup enters into new and hitherto unimagined 
relations (a gift to aliens who perceive it as a ritual object?). Within human 
interaction, which entails the interaction of perspectives, emergence is relatively 
common. Farmers may neither like nor want their crops of potatoes, but they do not 
throw them away. The farmer sees the crop of potatoes from the perspective of 
potential buyers as desirable and is thus able to cultivate what he or she does want 
for personal consumption. In the relation between the farmer and the buyer, the 
potatoes emerge as valuable. Finally, selves are also emergent in this general sense.  
According to Mead, our sense of self emerges through interaction. In 
particular, our sense of self emerges out of the relevancy that our actions have from 
the perspectives of others. To become a self, for Mead, entails becoming other to 
oneself. Mead argues that as we come to see ourselves from the perspective of other 
organisms we distanciate from ourselves and become self-reflective selves. Seeing 
ourselves from the perspectives of others means that we can act toward ourselves 
as if we were an other. In the same way that we might ask another a question, give a 
command, or issue praise, so by taking the perspective of the other, we can act in 
this way toward ourselves. Significant symbols are, for Mead (1922), the entwining 
of both the perspective of self and other into a single meaning (Gillespie, 2009; see 
also Vygotsky’s concept of the sign, as discussed in Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish, & 
Psaltis, 2007). The word ‘give,’ for example, is a significant symbol that combines the 
perspective of giving and getting. In a similar way, the word ‘run’ conjures both the 
feeling of running and the image of someone else running. By virtue of associating 
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disparate perspectives within a social act, significant symbols enable the movement 
of thought between perspectives within the given social act.  
Mead brings together his theorization of agency and emergence to analyze 
how we deal with a problematic situation. Mead (1903, p. 101-102) describes how 
in the process of thinking through a problem there is a “kaleidoscopic flash” of 
alternative possibilities, alternative pasts and futures, and alternative social 
perspectives. Our minds move between the perspectives within the social problem, 
supported by significant symbols. In thinking, we are, he argues, seeking to combine 
and integrate perspectives so as to generate the emergence of a new idea or new 
course of action that will get us out of the problematic situation. Thus, it is not only 
the ability to think through a situation in terms of various perspectives, but also the 
ability to integrate and coordinate them such that new relevancies emerge, that are 
central to a Meadian conception of agency. 
So far, we have detailed what agency is from a Meadian perspective. But, how 
do humans manage to distanciate from their immediate situation? How do 
possibilities that may never materialize become active within a given situation? How 
are humans able to see a given situation from the perspective of others? And how 
are these diverse perspectives brought into coordinated inter-relation such that 
creative emergence and thus agency might ensue? 
 Of particular importance, Mead (1932, 1934, 1938) held that it is only by 
acting toward ourselves as others do (that is, learning to react to our own actions as 
others have reacted and do react) that we recognize and understand ourselves as 
objects and authors of our own activity. As we learn to coordinate our acting with 
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the acting of others, we differentiate and develop our selves and our abilities to self-
determine. Eventually, we not only understand the perspectives (i.e., action 
orientations and possibilities) of numerous particular others, but also those 
perspectives explicit and implicit within the broader, more generalized social, 
cultural practices in which we are immersed and participate from birth. For Mead, 
the psychological lives of persons are forged in infancy and early childhood 
interactions with caregivers, in childhood play and games (especially those 
involving the coordination of positions, roles, and perspectives within phases of 
coordinated, cooperative activities), and in the gradually expanding vortex of social 
interactivity and intersubjectivity that comprises and fuels our ontogenetic 
development. 
 Mead maintains that social psychological phenomena such as meaning, mind, 
and self emerge within individual and collective interactions and coordinations 
nested and structured within social practices and conventions. Both our individual 
psychologies and our sociocultural practices and institutions are in a state of 
continuous, conditional interaction within which both are constantly emergent. 
Because the world consists of individual and collective perspectives (“The 
perspective is the world in its relationship to the individual and the individual in his 
relationship to the world” – Mead, 1938, p. 115), it is through taking and 
coordinating perspectives that are available within our worldly interactions with 
others that we develop psychologically as selves and agents. Thus, mind, selfhood, 
and agency are “not initially there at birth, but arise in the process of social 
experience and activity […] in the given individual as a result of his relations to that 
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process as a whole and to other individuals within that process” (Mead, 1934, p. 
135). Mead’s basic claim is that the mechanism for the development of self-
consciousness and selfhood is “the individual becoming an object to himself by 
taking the attitudes [perspectives] of other individuals toward himself within an 
organized setting of social relationships” (1934, p. 255). 
 Following Mead, Gillespie (2005, 2006, 2009, in press) and Martin (2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, in press) recently have attempted to clarify how the emergence of 
self-consciousness and self-determination during ontogenesis involves the 
simultaneous positioning within, taking of, and coordination of multiple 
perspectives (defined as orientations to situations with respect to acting within 
them) within conventional sequences of social interaction and practices. From these 
more recent writings, it is possible to extract a distinctive neo-Meadian theory of the 
ontogenesis of human agency. 
The Emergence of Selfhood, Perspective Coordination, and Agency 
 The neo-Meadian theorizing of Gillespie (2005, 2006, in press) and Martin 
(2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, in press) asserts that it is the positioning and interactivity 
of the developing individual with others and objects within conventional social 
practices and processes containing different perspectives that fuels the emergence 
of selfhood, psychological forms of perspective taking, and agentive self-
determination. Such emergence is a very gradual process. Perspective taking is not 
so much an ability that emerges, but rather an understanding of the social world 
that grows gradually. The processes that we describe are social, interactional, and 
institutional supports that scaffold and guide this gradual emergence, coaxing it on 
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to ever more abstract forms. The developmental pathway envisioned in this work is 
depicted in Figure 1, and consists of a graduated movement from social positioning 
within concrete, physical, here-and-now exchanges and practices to imaginative, 
abstracted, and psychological forms of perspective coordination and self-
determination, which may be spatially and temporally removed from the current 
situation and circumstances of the developing human agent. It is this gradual 
achievement of spatio-temporal distantiation from the pressing immediacy of 
current circumstances that places the actor within an expanded matrix of actual and 
imaginal perspectives and possibilities, at the intersections of which agentive 
activity emerges. Thus, the six points depicted in Figure 1 are not stages, because 
they never are left behind, but instead cumulate as continuing scaffold for further 
developmental emergence. Moreover, this is a developmental pathway that is 
simultaneously personal and public, cognitive and social. It is an interactive pathway 
that supports an unfolding pattern of being and knowing that envelops persons 
interacting within their biophysical and sociocultural world in graduated ways 
supportive of increasingly complex forms of perspective taking, distanciation from 
immediate situations, and thus agency. The following sections examine each 
segment of Figure 1 in turn. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Physical and Perceptual Interaction, with Assisted Tactile Exchange (Tactile 
Experience and Perceptual Recovery) 
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 The worldly interactivity of the neonate and infant already exhibits basic 
features that signal very initial forms of agentive possibility. Through orienting and 
reorienting to objects and others, especially the faces of caregivers (Trevarthen, 
1982, 1992), the infant achieves an early kind of perceptual recovery, as when 
mother’s face or breast are “lost” and then relocated (initially with the assistance of 
mother). The close, tactile contact between caregiver and infant also provides a 
responsive interactivity within which caregivers interpret the movements of infants 
and react in culturally sanctioned ways, such as when mother presents the breast 
contingent on the whimpers and mouthing’s of her baby. Such tactile interactivity 
itself is surprisingly multifaceted and ripe with developmental potential, as it 
involves the infant in a complex of touching and being touched by both another 
person and objects such as clothing and furnishings. Although initially scaffolded by 
the physical support of caregivers, the child quickly takes greater initiative with 
respect to re-orienting to, signaling to, and reaching out for others and objects. Such 
early interactions are multi-sensory and display a mixture of assistance and infant-
initiation. Together, they initiate the infant into a world that both supports and 
resists her actions, and offers an immediate, concrete basis for connecting her 
movements to the actions of others and the realities of objects. It is these very early 
forms of interactivity that seed possibilities for increasingly complex and 
participatory forms of worldly coordination with objects and others. 
 Nonetheless, even at this beginning of the journey along the path to agentive 
capability, at least three agency-relevant features of the child’s experience should be 
remarked. Through the perceptual recovery of others and objects, the infant begins 
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to differentiate between things that are susceptible to such recovery (e.g., mother, 
assuming she remains perceptually available) versus things that are not (e.g., a bird 
flying past a window), and becomes pre-reflectively attuned to the possibility of its 
own initiation of such recovery (Russell, 1996, 1999). Through others’ responses to 
what they interpret as the infant’s signals for attention, nurturance, and interest, the 
infant experiences sensory connections between others’ movements and actions 
and his activities (Bigelow, 1999). And, finally, through varieties of physical contact 
and touch, the infant senses differences among his own body, the bodies of others, 
and objects of varying degrees of resistance and manipulative possibility (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962; Rochat & Hespos, 1997; Rochat & Striano, 2002). In all of these ways, 
during early infancy, the physical interactivity and tactile exchanges of the baby 
within the biophysical and sociocultural world yield a sense of immediate presence 
as a distinct bodily object and locus of action and sensation in the world. It is this 
basic experiential sense of relational being that allows the infant increasingly to 
position itself with others and objects in a world of ongoing interactivity. 
Assisted Position Exchange With Others and Objects within Routine Interactions 
(Situated Remembrance and Anticipation; Basic Position Recovery) 
 As mentioned earlier, Mead (1934, 1938) understood the emergence of 
psychological being (meaning, mind, and self) as occurring within interactions and 
coordinations embedded within social practices. As the infant gains mobility and a 
sense of her own body and immediate experience in interaction with others and 
objects, she occupies and alternates among various positions within conventional 
social interactions. Her transactions within the world become coordinated within 
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such routine social practices as holding and being held, giving and receiving objects, 
following and initiating actions, chasing and escaping from others, looking at and 
looking away (e.g., peek-a-boo), being fed and feeding, being given and giving, hiding 
and seeking, and a myriad of other interactions involving repetitive sequences of 
alternative, related positionings (Gillespie, 2006; Martin, 2006). In all of these 
interactions, the child (with the assistance, as needed, of more experienced others) 
coordinates her actions with those of others, learning to respond appropriately to, 
and eventually to initiate sequences of interactivity with which she has become 
familiar. For example, when a ball is rolled to the young child, she learns to stop it 
and roll it back. When Daddy feeds her, she may take the spoon and feed Daddy. She 
also adopts and learns to alternate routine positions in common childhood games 
such as peek-a-boo and hide-and-seek.  
Through being positioned, and positioning herself, within different phases of 
routine sociocultural practices such as these, the young child comes to associate 
particular action tendencies and possibilities with particular phases and locations of 
conventionalized interactivity. She gradually comes to recall and anticipate being in 
positions interactively related to, but different from the positions she actually is 
occupying. When the child is able to imagine being and acting in one position (e.g., 
hiding), while actually being and acting in another, related position (e.g., seeking), 
she effectively engages in an early form of pre-reflective, situation-bound 
perspective taking. She literally occupies one set of action possibilities, while 
anticipating occupying a related set of action possibilities (Martin, Sokol, & Elfers, 
2008). In an important sense, the relations between the two sets of action 
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possibilities (i.e., the two perspectives) is one of partial co-constitution. In other 
words, each set of action possibilities partially comprises the other, as when the 
seeking child considers and imagines possible hiding places based on past 
experiences when hiding. Such basic embodied, embedded, and enactive forms of 
repetitive, conventionalized, and coordinated interactivity provide concrete, 
relatively immediate experience in being in more than one perspective or action 
framework at more or less the same time. The awareness of actions, habits, 
memories, and anticipations associated with a given situation while occupying and 
acting in a related situation is the hallmark of coordinated position exchange and 
pre-reflective perspective taking. During this segment of the developmental 
highway toward full-blown agentive capability, the young child already has achieved 
a modicum of spatiotemporal distance from his current action and location, at least 
to the extent that in acting appropriately within particular situations he is reaching 
forward in anticipation of what is immediately likely to follow. 
Position Exchange with Assisted Role Exchange Within Practices (Self-Other 
Differentiation; Imitative Coordination; Action ‘Consequenting’) 
 As the developing child begins to use language, she is able to hear herself 
more or less as others hear her, and according to Mead (1934, 1938) is able not only 
to act toward herself as others do and have done by recalling and anticipating 
positions within routine sequences of interactivity such as those described above, 
but she also is able to act toward her own articulations as others do and have done. 
The ability to act towards self as if self is another is a byproduct of significant 
symbols. As described above, Mead (1922) theorized language in terms of the 
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association and coordination of otherwise disparate perspectives within a social act, 
As such, language (or significant symbols) enables the movement at a psychological 
level between different perspectives within the given social act.  In beginning to 
respond to herself as both an object and a subject, the child not only furthers the 
differentiation of himself from others, but also enables a growing separation of 
action possibilities and orientations from actual positions within sequences of 
interactivity. Such possibilities and positions now contain both positional-relational 
and linguistic-symbolic aspects and coordinations. In this way, the developing agent 
begins to move toward more psychological orientations and perspectives that may 
be less closely tied to specific positions within interactive sequences. Such 
developmental accomplishments and distinctions are reflected in the child’s shift 
from informally structured positional play to more formally structured participation 
in games with multiple, coordinated roles4 (Mead, 1934, 1938). More generally, the 
child is now able to participate in role exchanges, where roles are informed by the 
broader sociocultural context. Whereas position exchanges involve movement 
within more or less immediate, here-and-now situations and practices, role 
exchanges require movement across positions defined by roles, expectations, and 
normative cultural practices. Since roles derive their meaning from their 
                                                        
4 Social positions refer to actual locations within fields of activity. Each social 
position entails a distinctive social situation that frames the associated perspective. 
In addition each social position entails related social positions that co-constitute 
each other (e.g., buyer-seller, giving-getting, speaking-listening, etc.). Social roles, on 
the other hand, refer more to the expectations and norms associated with more 
institutionalized social positions (i.e., mother, father, doctor, teacher, bus driver 
roles) 
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embeddedness within sociocultural rules and practices, they go well beyond the 
immediate situations in which role plays are enacted, and may be facilitated greatly 
by verbal and performative coaching by other, more experienced interactors. 
 Thus, frequently with the assistance of others (peers, parents, other adults), 
the child who participates in role exchanges begins to enter into more abstracted, 
rule-governed social practices that reflect vocational, economic, political, and 
personal traditions of living extant in her broader communities. Childhood games 
like “cops and robbers” are early examples, but so too are children’s re-enactments 
of multi-character narratives made popular through children’s stories and films. In 
these and many other more-and-less immediate interactions, children not only 
coordinate their own actions with the positions and actions of other actual and 
imagined characters, but do so according to shared, sometimes verbalized 
understandings of relevant social functions, responsibilities, expectations, and 
social-psychological features that accompany and define specific ways of acting and 
experiencing characteristic of the social roles being enacted. 
  In addition to enhancing self-other differentiation, the more 
spatiotemporally abstracted understandings and imaginings that now enter into the 
child’s coordination of perspectives and action possibilities enables an additional 
separation between actual and anticipated consequences. With increased 
experience in enacting particular aspects and features of various social roles, and 
not enacting others, children begin to experience and consider actual and possible 
consequences of their role-related actions within a broader, more abstracted system 
of social practices and coordinations that define the life of their communities. Events 
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that do not occur inform the child’s social understanding, just as do events that 
occur. The developing child is still unable to articulate most such “dawning 
awarenesses.” However, greater differentiation of self from others, an increased 
appreciation of more abstracted social-psychological features and characteristics of 
actions and actors, and the ability to imagine the possible consequences of actions 
all prepare the child for a much more psychological form of perspective taking and 
coordination. 
Position/Role Exchange with Reflective Perspective Taking/Coordination 
(Simultaneity of Perspectives; Differentiation of Persons; Doing things with Words) 
 The child’s development of distinctly psychological (in the sense of 
spatiotemporally distanciated) forms of perspective taking and coordination has 
been studied extensively by Robert Selman (1973, 1980) who also has been 
influenced greatly by the ideas of Mead (1932, 1934, 1938) concerning the social, 
interactive bases of perspective taking and coordination. Recently, Martin, Sokol, 
and Elfers (2008) have provided a neo-Meadian interpretation of Selman’s (1973, 
1980) theory of perspective taking in terms of what they term, “reflective 
intersubjectivity.” Following and adapting Selman (1973, 1980), Martin et al.’s focus 
is on children’s coordination of their own perspectives with those of others, a 
developmental process that involves the child taking up multiple perspectives 
simultaneously, recognizing and differentiating others as persons with perspectives 
other than their own, and using their developing linguistic capabilities to 
communicate these capabilities, recognitions, and differentiations to others. It is in 
these ways that perspective taking and coordination are accomplished 
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independently of physical and physically-supported position and role exchange – a 
significant advance in the development of persons as psychological beings and 
agents. 
 More specifically, the child’s graduated participation in the forms of reflective 
intersubjectivity that yield more psychological forms of perspective taking and 
coordination begins with the child interacting with others as distinctive individuals, 
a mode of interaction enabled by the self-other differentiations accomplished 
through experience within the position and role exchanges previously described. At 
first, the child’s own action orientiations (perspectives) predominate such 
interactions, with little apparent consideration of the others’ perspectives. However, 
gradually the child comes to coordinate with others not only as distinctive 
individuals, but also as individuals who hold perspectives, social understandings, 
and interests different from the child’s. Such a shift may be recognized in the child’s 
attempts to convince others of the relative advantages of adopting the child’s own, 
preferred ways of playing or interacting rather than alternatives apparently favored 
by relevant others. Still later, the use of such basic forms of negotiating is eclipsed by 
more fully intersubjective forms of coordination that demonstrate an understanding 
and willingness to coordinate and negotiate with distinctive others who not only 
have their own perspectives and interests, but are also aware of some of the ways in 
which these might differ from those of the child. A typical indication of such 
reflective recognition of perspectival reciprocation occurs when the older child’s 
interactions display negotiations and coordinations that take into consideration the 
way in which the child is regarded by others – e.g., including apologies for possibly 
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offending others. Obviously, such exchanges rely greatly on the child’s acquisition of 
more complex, indexical and narrative forms of language to refer to events and 
occurrences in the here-and-now, and to make inferences from such events and 
occurrences, in combination with the child’s now enhanced forms of social 
experience and understanding, some of which refer to imagined psychological and 
future possibilities that are imaginatively stimulated by and abstracted from the 
current situation. 
 Nonetheless, even with the abilities to differentiate others as psychological 
beings who are coordinating their perspectives with those of the child, to consider a 
number of perspectives and possibilities simultaneously, and to do things with 
language that go well beyond the immediate confines of interactive situations, the 
older child typically still is unable to generalize and imaginatively coordinate 
perspectives and possibilities from relevant third person, societal perspectives that 
might be employed to position the child’s particular interactive and intersubjective 
coordinations with others within potentially relevant, broader social networks and 
conventions. Appeal to such broader, socially sanctioned systems and the 
collaborative forms of deliberation and collective problem solving they make 
possible are important developmental milestones yet to come.    
Imaginative Coordination and Generalization of Perspectives and Possibilities 
(Generation and Evaluation of Possibilities; Deliberate Planning and Problem 
Solving) 
 The final accomplishments that typify fully reflective intersubjectivity 
according to Martin  et al. (2008) go beyond the intersubjectivity of interacting 
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individuals to encompass third-person and societal perspectives that are used to 
mediate impasses in interpersonal negotiations and problem solving. Examples 
include children’s interpretation of rules of a game to resolve disputes that arise in 
team competitions, or children’s discussions of whether or not what has occurred to 
occasion disruption in their conversations and activities falls within acceptable 
bounds of larger group and social conventions. At more advanced levels, 
adolescents’ problematic interactions with each other may be explicitly subjected to 
relevant social conventions and perspectives drawn from networks of societal 
practices, institutionalized values, and ideological commitments. Such attempted 
coordinations and resolutions involve positioning adolescents’ own self-
understandings and those of their interlocutors within these larger social networks. 
Increasingly, the action tendencies, perspectives, and interests of individuals are 
consolidated in terms of distinctive individual identities capable of acknowledging 
alternative identities, commitments, and ideologies of other individuals and groups. 
With the aid of a wide variety of supplements to direct interactivity and 
intersubjectivity, some of which can be found in symbolic resources (Gillespie & 
Zittoun, 2010; Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson & Psaltis, 2003) such as novels, 
films, on-line materials, and so forth, an increasingly abstracted set of perspectives 
associated with diverse traditions and ways of life5 may be examined for possible 
                                                        
5 It is inherent in the nature of a narrative (fiction, film, TV, novels, life stories etc) that 
there is an interaction of perspectives. The protagonists see the world differently, are 
aware of different things, and the interaction between those awarenesses is a large part of 
the narrative. Accordingly, we could say that stories support perspective cultivation and 
integration. For example, think of a story such as little red riding hood. The movement of 
the story oscillates between the perspective of little red riding hood and the wolf – 
differentiating the perspectives, and also encouraging the child to see the situation from 
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ways of proceeding in joint, communal endeavors, especially as problems and 
difficulties arise that occasion disagreement and block progress. 
 At this point in the development of individual and collective agency, 
adolescents are immersed in a matrix of perspectives that they use purposefully to 
generate possibilities for enacting projects and plans that they associate with their 
individual and communal identities. Narrative structures and content derived from 
many sources may be drawn upon to integrate and coordinate spatially and 
temporally distant perspectives to envision possibilities and form plans in the 
pursuit of what are rightfully regarded as important life projects. In these ways, 
stories, films, histories, and imaginings create a vortex of past and future 
consideration and anticipation in the present that enable the deliberately agentive 
activity of individuals in planning, charting, and creating their own futures through 
deliberatively coordinated, communal forms of agency that involve goal-directed, 
problem-embedded perspective and possibility formulation, and jointly 
coordinated, agentive interactivity. 
For Mead (1934), the resolution of interpersonal, social conflict always requires 
reconstruction of both selves and societies, as theorized in Mead’s perspectival approach 
to self development within the social process. Since the agentive self always responds to 
those social perspectives in which it has been forged, it always retains the possibility of 
agentive critique. The close relationship between the Meadian self and the social process 
means that explicit social criticism always entails implicit self-criticism and vice versa. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
both points of view. 
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For Mead, “social reconstruction and self or personality reconstruction are the two sides 
of a single process – the process of human social evolution” (Mead, 1934, p. 309). As 
persons and developing persons, human beings are embedded in an ongoing flux of 
perspectives that flows from and can be used to guide their worldly interactivity. As 
social beings, persons are constituted within their perspectival interactivity. In choosing, 
acting upon, and realizing possibilities for action and interaction that emerge at the 
interfaces of multiple perspectives, human agents continuously are involved in the 
ongoing creation of themselves and their societies. As adolescents and young adults 
imaginatively coordinate, frame, and generalize perspectives and possibilities through 
deliberate planning and problem solving with others, they come to realize their potential 
as agents capable of transforming themselves and their world. 
Rational and Moral Engagement With Others (Acting for Reasons, and with 
Consideration and Justification) 
 The realization of transformative potential through engagement in individual 
and collective problem solving that makes use of imagination and rational planning 
not only depends on sophisticated forms of spatiotemporal distanciation and 
consideration, but also brings into focus requirements for the exercise of moral 
agency. Given that many personal and social perspectives are deeply embedded 
within socioculural traditions and ideologies, when individuals engage with each 
other across such divides, they necessarily invoke communicative ideas, at least 
implicitly and often explicitly, as guides, constraints, and possibilities in their 
pursuit of broad levels of consensus building and communal problem solving. Such 
considerations are steeped in ethical and moral reasoning about such matters as 
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equitable access to communicative resources, time, and authority. Even if formalized 
procedures and rules are eschewed in favor of pragmatic appeals to encourage the 
emergence of creativity that might result in novel approaches to context-specific 
challenges and conditions, individual participants must somehow maintain 
productive engagement with others that requires an openness to the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of a wide range of plausible perspectives. 
 At this advanced point in the development of the perspective taking and 
coordination that enable rational and moral agency, individuals must distance 
themselves from available perspectives and systems that have proven unworkable 
so that a hypothetical space is opened up for the communal creation of new forms of 
consideration and action. To be able to act within such situations, individuals 
necessarily must use whatever rational and moral traditions are available to them 
through their own experiences and interactions with others, even as they recognize 
the need to go beyond these resources to create new possibilities for engagement 
and problem solving. It is the ability to remain committed and engaged within such 
contexts of ambiguity, uncertainty, and emotional upheaval that marks the exercise 
of an agentive personhood that is simultaneously connected to, yet transcends its 
more spatiotemporally constricted antecedent forms. Such capability is a graduated 
consequence of the developmental journey we have attempted briefly to describe 
here. However, this capability can never be complete. It does not make sense to talk 
about distanciation being complete at any level nor does it make any sense to think 
of rational and moral engagement with others as an end point. Distanciation is 
always bounded within specific contexts and social relations and as such complete 
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distanciation is a logical impossibility. 
Our neo-Meadian account began with the physical placement and assisted 
positioning of infants within basic and routine sequences of interactivity with 
others, charted the gradual emergence of less temporally and contextually 
constrained forms of perspective taking from earlier interactions involving position 
and role exchange, and achieved increasingly abstracted and sophisticated forms of 
rational and moral agency assisted by the spatiotemporal bridging and integration 
supplied by imaginative planning, open-ended problem solving, and cooperative 
engagement and creativity in the face of challenges not amenable to extant 
traditions of living and existing perspectival systems. The development of 
personhood through this developmental trajectory involved a gradual 
differentiation of self and others as psychological beings with first-person 
perspectives and experiences, together with capabilities of reason and moral 
concern that permit the critical consideration of a variety of immediate and more 
distant perspectives and possibilities in choosing, planning, and coordinating 
perspectives and actions in difficult, challenging circumstances. Along the way, 
physical assistance, coaching, narratives, and moral systems came into play as 
increasingly complex sociocultural supports for the advancement of more and more 
complex forms of perspective taking, coordination, and distantiation6 removed from 
the immediate situation, yet always connected to challenges and impasses located 
                                                        
6 The relation between the social and the psychological is not static – it develops with the 
development of the individual. As the individual becomes more independent of the 
environment they can then participate in more complex social processes, which further 
support the process of distanciation and decentration. 
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therein. In order to make this analysis we have separated individuals from culture, 
but this has been an ‘inclusive separation’ (Valsiner, 2007) for the purpose of 
analysis. The outcome of our analysis is that the self is deeply cultural (Christopher 
& Bickhard, 2007). Our analysis has focused on how agency emerges through the 
scaffold provided by social structures and relations, another analysis could focus on 
the emergence of the social technologies within the scaffold. While all societies have 
likely made use of position exchange, playing with dolls, role play and narratives, 
there have also been differences in the scaffold. And one wonders how new 
information technologies which constitute new forms of social relation will feed into 
the future development of agency. 
 Consistent with the ideas of George Herbert Mead (1932, 1934, 1938), we 
have attempted to describe the emergence of both selfhood and agency in relation to 
the interactivity of individuals with others within a world that is simultaneously 
biophysical and sociocultural, and to do so in ways that do not assume the prior 
existence of either selfhood or agentive capability. We also have tried to retain 
Mead’s emphasis on social acts and practices, even at more advanced levels7 of the 
development of spatiotemporally flexible capabilities of imaginative planning and 
creative problem solving. In our opinion, it is this consistent emphasis on the 
dynamic, coordinating interactivity that constantly restructures persons within 
                                                        
7 Position exchange in a broad sense is a uniting thread. Initially it manifests as touching 
and being touched, the reversibility of that basic action begins the process of 
differentiating the self out of the social world. Then, there are classic social acts – such as 
children’s games and interactive routines. And, at more complex levels there are 
narratives, complex feats of organization, and moral dilemmas – each of which entails 
people shifting between perspectives and integrating them. 
 
                                                                     A Neo-Meadian Approach to Human Agency  31 
their societies that is the center-piece of Mead’s social psychology of human agency.  
Concluding Considerations 
 Several past interpretations of Mead’s rendering of the emergence of 
selfhood and agency have expressed concern that Mead’s account assumes the 
selfhood and agency that it claims to explain. Such concerns (e.g., Frie, 1997; Vessey, 
1998) assume that the primary developmental mechanism operative in Mead’s 
developmental theorizing is not perspective taking and coordination, but 
internalization – “it could never be the process of internalization which functions as 
the origin of mind for the power of internalization depends on there being already a 
reflexive relation to oneself” (Vessey, 1998, p. 6). However, the neo-Meadian 
approach to the development of human agency described herein does away with the 
requirement of a pre-existing “internalizer” who already has a sense of herself and 
others as subjects with distinctive perspectives. By explaining how more 
psychological forms of perspective taking arise within more basic physical and 
social processes of position and role exchange, perspective taking itself is provided 
with an emergent developmental history, one that is continuously interactive with a 
graduated differentiation of self from others and objects. In our opinion, the 
developmental sequences of position and role exchange we have described preclude 
any necessity of positing psychological forms of internalization as the prime movers 
of self-other differentiation, perspective taking and coordination, or the 
spatiotemporal distantiation basic to agentive capability. 
 Not only does the developmental primacy of position and role exchange in 
our account do away with any necessity of assuming pre-existent capabilities of 
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internalization or a pre-existing internalizer, it also replaces the pivotal role given to 
imitation in many contemporary developmental approaches, even those that in 
many other ways display a preference for theorizing about coordinated activity and 
interactivity (e.g., Hobson, 2002; Tomasello, 2008). The problem we see with 
imitation accounts already has been reflected in our response to Vessey’s (1998) 
concerns with internalization accounts. If the act of imitation is accepted as a basis 
for the acquisition of some of most basic ways of acting in the world, human infants 
must already be capable of imitation – that is, they must be innate imitators8. We do 
not doubt that human infants may very well display innate tendencies to orient to 
others, perhaps particularly to the faces of others, as Trevarthan (1982, 1992) 
insists. However, rather than assuming the much “richer” innateness of the self-
other differentiation and spatiotemporal sequencing that imitation requires, we 
believe that a more parsimonious, less speculative position is available if we assume 
that imitation emerges developmentally from infants’ assisted participation in 
simple, repetitive sequences of interactivity within which they observe simple 
actions of others (smiles, nods, etc.) and are encouraged and assisted by others to 
follow their observations of such actions with similar actions of their own. Such 
early sequences of interactivity amount to very initial exchanges between the 
positions of “leader” and “follower,” and imitation as a more generalized form of 
“following the actions of others” may be seen to emerge developmentally through 
such initial infant interactivity. What we hope to have accomplished with these brief 
                                                        
8 For a useful critique of imitation as a basis for our earliest actions in the world as 
infants, see Anisfeld (1996). 
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considerations of how position and role exchanges can developmentally anchor the 
emergence of more complex forms of imitation and internalization, is an important 
facet of what we regard as the relative theoretical superiority of our neo-Meadian 
account when compared to more currently popular cognitive, theory of mind 
accounts (also, see Carpendale & Lewis, 1996). Through understanding positioning 
and exchange within coordinated interactivity with others (initially scaffolded by 
the direct, physical assistance of caregivers and others) as a developmental basis for 
more complex social-psychological processes such as imitation, self-other 
differentiation, perspective taking, and internalization, we are able to reduce the 
number of assumptions concerning innate, pre-given, and pre-existent capabilities 
that infants must have to engage productively in a world that is, developmentally 
speaking, biophysical and sociocultural before it is fully psychological. In Mead’s 
(1977) own words, “A self can arise only where there is a social process within 
which this self has had its initiation. It arises within that process” (p. 42). This is in 
contrast to theoretical approaches, often stemming from the late Piaget, which 
emphasize the child’s interaction with the natural environment with only secondary 
reference to social processes. Mead’s position and our position is that agency comes 
not through logical operations but through getting outside oneself through 
perspective taking cultivated through social relations. What we have tried to do is to 
chart a developmental pathway within this social process that describes and 
explains how the coordinated interactivity of the infant, child, adolescent, and adult 
constitutes a gradually emergent unfolding of agentive personhood. 
 With respect to long-standing debates between determinism and agency 
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understood as free-will, our position is that contemporary theorizing and research 
concerning the developmental emergence of persons in ontogeny is up to the task of 
explaining the emergence of self-determining agents with the suite of rational and 
moral capabilities typically attributed to persons. These are capabilities of 
remembrance, anticipation, role and perspective exchange, intersubjectivity, social 
understanding, planning, problem solving, and concerned engagement with others 
that enable persons to act in the world in ways that warrant ascriptions of 
responsibility for their decisions and actions. If it is assumed that the determination 
of persons must include their own capabilities of self-determination, a viable 
rendering of the developmental emergence of such agentive capabilities should 
replace traditional impasses that have set agency and determinism in irreconcilable 
opposition. In offering our neo-Meadian theory of the ontogenetic emergence of 
agentive personhood, we have attempted to theorize the self-determination of 
persons as a developmental process that emerges within a determined biophysical 
and sociocultural world as a trajectory of chronologically ordered, increasingly 
complex, and spatiotemporally distantiated interactivities through which the 
developing individual coordinates with particular and generalized others and their 
perspectives. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1: The social scaffolding of progressive psychological distanciation in the development of 
human agency (self-determination) 
 
 
 
Sociocultural  Scaffolding  Psychological Distanciation 
 
 
 
Engagement in Moral dilemmas 
and abstract feelings of 
responsibility, through rational and 
moral consideration and 
justification 
Abstract rational and moral 
discourses about rights and 
responsibilities 
 
 Imagining, coordinating, and 
generalizing multiple perspectives 
and possibilities beyond present 
interactions and contexts, through 
the generation and evaluation of 
possibilities, and deliberative 
planning/problem solving. 
Real and fictional narratives (books, 
films, and other cultural media)  
 
 Reflective perspective taking 
within particular sociocultural 
activities, through language-aided 
multiperspectivity and an 
understanding/differentiation of 
self and others as psychological 
persons 
Exchanging social positions within 
complex sociocultural acts 
 
 Action appropriate within 
sociocultural norms, through 
social, psychological 
differentiation of self and other, 
imitative coordination, and action 
‘consequenting’ 
Assisted action within and movement 
between cultural-linguistic roles 
 
 Action appropriate to social 
position and pre-reflective 
orientation to other, through 
situated remembrance and 
anticipation 
Assisted action within and movement 
between routine interaction positions 
 
 Differentiation of own body from 
other beings and objects, through 
tactile experience and perceptual 
recovery 
Physical and perceptual interaction 
with assisted tactile exchange 
 
